

Message Text

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ACTION EB-08

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 USIA-06
TRSE-00 SOE-02 DOE-11 CIAE-00 COME-00 IO-13 L-03
INR-10 PM-05 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 /093 W
-----088159 021310Z /45

P R 021212Z MAR 78

FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3166

INFO AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 0844

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ESTC, SW

SUBJECT: PROPOSED CONTROLS ON EXPORTS FROM NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

REF: A) STOCKHOLM 794, B) STATE 43553

1. I WELCOME THE PROPOSAL TO DISCUSS EXPORT CONTROLS WITH THE SWEDES.

2. THE SWEDES ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON US PRODUCTS AND TECHNOLOGY. THE RECORD SHOWS, I BELIEVE, THAT SWEDEN COOPERATES FULLY WITH US EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, THE SWEDES HAVE BEEN SCRUPULOUS ABOUT OBSERVING OUR RE-EXPORT REGULATIONS WHEN US COMPONENTRY IS INVOLVED. BECAUSE OF THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF US TECHNOLOGY TO SWEDISH SECURITY, I AM CONVINCED THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO COUNT ON THEIR FULL COOPERATION.

3. THE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES CONCERNED SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT SWEDISH NEUTRALITY OR NON-ALIGNMENT IS DEEPLY ROOTED IN SWEDISH PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS. THERE IS GREAT SENSITIVITY HERE TO BEING IDENTIFIED WITH NATO (OR
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WITH COCOM), JUST AS THERE IS TO BEING LEANED ON BY THE SUPER-POWERS.

4. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE NON-PAPER IN REFTEL B, BUT URGE THAT SWEDISH SENSITIVITIES BE KEPT IN MIND IN PRESENTING US VIEWS. (THUS WE AGREE WITH VIENNA 1679 THAT POINT 8 IS NEEDLESSLY OFFENSIVE.) FROM THE DIS-

CUSSIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH GOS OFFICIALS, I BELIEVE THAT YOU WILL FIND THE SWEDES RESPONSIVE TO US VIEWS IN A GENERAL WAY.

5. I HAVE A SERIOUS OBJECTION TO RAISING THE ASEA CASE (NUCON 400). FROM THE CONVERSATIONS I, THE DCM, THE ECONOMIC COUNSELOR AND OTHERS HAVE HAD WITH SECRETARY GENERAL LEIFLAND AT THE MFA, MINISTER ASLING AND DEPARTMENT HEAD NIKLASSON AT THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, AND OTHERS, WE ARE ACUTELY AWARE THAT THIS IS A SENSITIVE MATTER FOR THE GOS AND THAT THE GOS AS A MATTER OF POLICY CONSIDERS THIS A CLOSED ISSUE. ONE ASPECT OF THIS POLICY IS THAT THE CONTRACT IS SIGNED AND SWEDEN CANNOT AFFORD TO HAVE ITS RELIABILITY QUESTIONED IN EASTERN EUROPE. (SO FAR AS WE KNOW, WASHINGTON EXPERTS HAVE LONG BEEN AWARE OF THIS ANGLE AND WERE INSTEAD ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE ASEA INFORMALLY TO LIMIT KNOWHOW TRANSFER--THE LIMITS OF WHICH ARE POSSIBLY NOT YET FIXED.) ANOTHER ASPECT IS THAT SINCE THE SWEDES SAY CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE ARE NO REPEAT NO US COMPONENTS IN THE NUCON 400, THEY BELIEVE THAT TO SUBJECT THEMSELVES TO US INQUIRIES FURTHER WOULD COMPROMISE THEIR INDEPENDENCE FROM COCOM. WHILE IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS MIGHT RAISE THE NUCON 400 PURELY FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES WITHOUT CAUSING SERIOUS HARM, I FEAR THAT RAISING IT IN ANY WAY CONFIDENTIAL

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RISKS TOUCHING SENSITIVE "NEUTRAL" NERVES HERE. I DO NOT MIND THIS IF SOME END IS GAINED, BUT IN THIS CASE I FEAR OUR ONLY EFFECT WOULD BE TO HURT PROSPECTS FOR FULL SWEDISH COOPERATION IN LARGER EXPORT CONTROL POLICIES.

6. I WISH TO REPEAT THAT THE POSITION DESCRIBED ABOVE IS A SWEDISH GOVERNMENT POSITION STRONGLY HELD. I AM, OF COURSE, EAGER TO HEAR ANY EVIDENCE (A) THAT THE NUCON 400 HAS US COMPONENTS OR (B) THAT WE HAVE SOME BASIS FOR ARGUING AGAINST THE DEAL. IT DOES SEEM TO ME THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN THIS MATTER IS ON THE US SIDE. THEREFORE I REQUEST THAT THE NUCON 400 MATTER NOT BE RAISED WITH THE SWEDES PRIOR TO MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON ON CONSULATION MARCH 13. IF IN THE MEANWHILE THE DEPARTMENT WISHES TO PROCEED WITH THE GENERAL PRESENTATION WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE ASEA DEAL, THAT PROCEDURE WOULD BE WELCOME TO ME. IF AFTER GOING OVER THIS DURING MY CONSULTATION THE DEPARTMENT STILL FEELS STRONGLY THAT WE DO NEED TO DISCUSS THE NUCON 400 WITH THE SWEDES, AND THAT DISCUSSION IS WORTH THE RISKS INVOLVED, I WOULD BE MORE THAN HAPPY TO GO ALONG, AND WOULD IN FACT BE GLAD TO TAKE PART IN THE DISCUSSIONS MYSELF IF THAT

WOULD BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE.
KENNEDY-MINOTT

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: EXPORTS, NONALIGNED NATIONS, STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 02 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STOCKH00844
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780095-0876
Format: TEL
From: STOCKHOLM
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197803113/aaaadrxx.tel
Line Count: 118
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 4acbbab9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EB
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 STOCKHOLM 794, 78 STATE 43553
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3136836
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PROPOSED CONTROLS ON EXPORTS FROM NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES
TAGS: ESTC, SW
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/4acbbab9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014